Alliance des Démocrates Indépendants en Europe

Amendment by
Amendment 6
Recital A
A. whereas throughout the last 50 years the development of the European Union, born out of peace between nations, has been fundamental in establishing an area of peace a fundamental element for and stability in a continent previously ravaged by war, in consolidating democracy, freedom and citizens' rights, in enhancing prosperity and welfare through the creation of the world's largest single market with common rules for social standards, consumer protection and fair competition and with an economic and monetary union, in enabling Member States to work together to address issues that transcend national borders, not least the environment, and in giving Europe a stronger voice in world affairs,


Amendment by
Amendment 9
Recital B
B. whereas there is a recognised need to reform - taking account of today's circumstances in Europe, notably "the number of Member States, the diverse nature of the different economies and societies, the revival of identity politics, and the absence of an external threat" (Jean-Louis Bourlanges, Le Monde, 3 12 2007) - and strengthen the structures of the Union in order to consolidate these achievements and to improve the capacity of a Union of twenty-seven, and potentially more, Member States to function effectively so as to enable it to face common new challenges and to be subject to greater democratic accountability,
Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 12
Recital C
C. whereas this need was the origin of the successive reforms that, since the Treaty of Maastricht - which marked a shift in European integration, with the creation of an economic and monetary union and the passage from an essentially economic community to a political union - have tried to settle the institutional structure of the Union and led to the Declaration of Laeken, which also opened the way to a different process for reform, based on the Convention method and no longer based exclusively on intergovernmental conferences, stressing notably that 'what citizens … expect is … not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life',
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 13
Recital D
D. whereas the previous effort to reform the Union by means of replacing the Treaties with a Constitution was endorsed by a very large majority of the elected representatives of European citizens in the European Parliament and was ratified by 2/3 of the Member States by the parliamentary route (except in Spain and Luxembourg) but was rejected by referendums in two (France and the Netherlands) and, after a period of reflection in which it became clear that the necessary approval by all Member States could not be attained, this approach was abandoned in favour of amending the pre-existing Treaties instead so as to incorporate the provisions of a constitutional treaty rejected by two peoples,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 16
Recital E
E. whereas the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe had been drafted by a Convention, composed of two representatives from every national parliament, sixteen MEPs, two representatives of the European Commission and a representative of every national government, who prepared a draft in public deliberation, producing a consensus which was left essentially unchanged by the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, while the subsequent Treaty of Lisbon, which dropped some of the non-substantive features of the Constitution relating to the symbols of the Union, resulted from traditional intergovernmental working methods with meetings behind closed doors,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 19
Recital F
F. whereas this shift in method and process, while retaining in a new form many of the practical adjustments to the institutional structure of the Union that it envisaged, implied a lessening of the ambition and an abandonment of several features of the Constitution, essentially of an aesthetic nature, the postponement of the entry into force of some of its new mechanisms and the incorporation in the Treaties of particular measures specific to various Member States,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 20
Recital G
G. whereas nonetheless, the agreement to the Treaty of every single national government in the Union demonstrates that the elected governments of Member States all consider that this compromise is the basis on which they wish to work together in the future and will require each of them to demonstrate maximum political commitment to ensuring ratification by 1 January 2009, with each of them (except for Ireland, where a referendum is compulsory), remaining free to choose either the parliamentary method or a referendum, the latter being the surer means of linking the peoples to their European destiny,
Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 22
Recital H
H. whereas it is desirable that the new Treaty enters into force well in advance of the elections for the European Parliament in 2009, in order to allow citizens to make their political choices in full knowledge of the new institutional framework of the Union, but also, where no referendum is held, to express their approval or disapproval of that new institutional framework,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 27
Paragraph 1
1. Concludes that, taken as a whole, the Treaty of Lisbon is a substantial improvement on the existing Treaties, which will bring more democratic accountability to the Union (through a strengthening of the roles of the European Parliament and the national parliaments), enhance the rights of the European citizens vis-à-vis the Union and ameliorate the effective functioning of the Union's institutions; there is consequently no reason for the citizens to reject it, considering also that, Ireland excepted, no government will ask for their opinion by referendum,

Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 40
Paragraph 2, point a), indent 2
– the prior scrutiny of national parliaments over all the legislation of the Union will be reinforced as they will receive all European legislative proposals in good time to discuss them with their ministers before the Council adopts a position and will also gain the right to object to a proposal if they feel it does not respect the principle of subsidiarity; calls on the Council to indicate, in this connection, the exact nature of the obligation on a European institution to 'take account' of the 'reasoned opinion' of a national parliament under Article 7 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 43
Paragraph 2, point b)
b) the President of the Commission will be elected by the European Parliament, on a proposal of the European Council (with qualified majority voting) and 'taking into account the elections to the European Parliament'; calls on the Council to specify whether and how such an alignment with a political majority in the Member States and/or Parliament is compatible with the principle that 'the Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union', as enunciated in Article 9D;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 45
Paragraph 2, point c)
c) the High Representative will be accountable to both the European Council and the President of the Commission (whose agreement is necessary to his/her nomination) and, as a member of the Commission, to the European Parliament; calls on the Council to specify to whom the High Representative is to be responsible, other than where the Commission's collective responsibility applies, given that he cannot be dismissed by either the Commission President or the Council of Ministers;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 46
Paragraph 2, point c)
c) the High Representative will be accountable to both the European Council and the President of the Commission (whose agreement is necessary to his/her nomination) and, as a member of the Commission, to the European Parliament; calls on the Council to specify how a synthesis will be achieved between the Commission's external relations and the Council's external policy and indicate which, Commission or European Council, will provide the main impetus for the Union's foreign policy;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 47
Paragraph 2, point c)
c) the High Representative will be accountable to both the European Council and the President of the Commission (whose agreement is necessary to his/her nomination) and, as a member of the Commission, to the European Parliament; calls on the Council to specify who will represent the Union to the outside world, given that Article 25 attributes such representation of the CFSP to the President of the European Council 'without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative', and to indicate how the conflict will be resolved, in foreign policy choices, between the positions of the Commission, which is supposed to defend 'the general interest of the Union', and the Council, which represents the Member States;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 52
Paragraph 2, point d)
d) the new budgetary procedure will require the approval of both the Council and the European Parliament for all Union's expenditure, thus bringing virtually all the Union's expenditure under full democratic control; calls on the Council, in this connection, to clarify its position on the possibility of establishing a 'Europe tax', as a logical manifestation of the decisions on public expenditure which will in future be taken primarily by the European Parliament;
Or. fr

Amendment by º
Amendment 58
Paragraph 2, point e)
e) the democratic control of the exercise of delegated legislative powers by the Commission will be reinforced through a new system of supervision by the European Parliament and the Council that will enable each of them to call back Commission decisions on delegated legislation to which they object and give each of them the right to revoke the delegation of powers; calls on the Council, nonetheless, to indicate the criteria making it possible to distinguish what Article 249b calls 'non-essential elements of the legislative act' from what is essential, in order not to transfer legislative powers by stealth and without consent;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 63
Paragraph 2, point g)
g) agencies, notably Europol, will be subject to greater parliamentary scrutiny; calls on the Council to specify the nature of this scrutiny, as well as that of the 'association' of the national parliaments in the 'evaluation' of the implementation of the policies of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and the monitoring of Eurojust;
Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 65
Paragraph 2, point h)
h) the role of the Committee of the Regions is reinforced, notably by granting this non-representative organ the right of appeal to the Court of Justice against legislative acts adopted by the Member States; calls on the Council to justify granting this right and, more generally, the usefulness and the quantity of the expenditure inevitably generated by bodies of this nature to the European taxpayer;
Or. fr



Amendment by
Amendment 67
Paragraph 2, point i)
i) the procedure for revising the Treaties will be, in future, more open and democratic, as the European Parliament will also gain the power to submit proposals to that end, and the scrutiny of any proposed revision must be carried out by a Convention which will include representatives of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, unless Parliament agrees that this is not necessary; calls on the Council to specify the exact composition of the Convention provided for in Article 48, and, in particular, whether it will be dominated by representatives of the national parliaments or, once again, by those of the EU institutions;
Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 70
Paragraph 2a (new)
2a. calls on the Council to specify exactly how the democratic scrutiny of EU legislation will be strengthened by the protocol on the national parliaments, in comparison with the equivalent existing protocol (No 13) annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, other than in the provisions on the content of the information forwarded to the national parliaments and a limited expansion of interparliamentary cooperation;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 71
Paragraph 2b (new)
2b. Calls on the Council, in order to measure the scope of parliamentary scrutiny of decisions at European level by the ministers of the Member States, to specify the nature, behind the appearance of nominal power, of the real margins of action in the legislative process under Article 293 of the TFUE (ex Article 250 of the EC Treaty);
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 72
Paragraph 2c (new)
2c. Calls on the Council to specify, pursuant to Article 7 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, whether the term 'review' employed in paragraph 2 ('Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act's non-compliance with the principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated to the national Parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph of the first paragraph, the draft must be reviewed') should be understood as an invitation or an obligation to revise a draft act considered not to comply with the principle of subsidiarity by at least one third of the national parliaments;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 73
Paragraph 2d (new)
2d . Calls on the Council to specify whether the early warning procedure for the national parliaments will apply, as its wording suggests, exclusively to subsidiarity issues and not to proportionality issues, despite both the eminently political nature of the latter and the title of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 76
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council, nonetheless, to specify whether the Charter, like all Union law, takes precedence over national law, including constitutional provisions, and, in particular, over the fundamental rights of centuries' standing that are protected by precedent under national law in Ireland and the UK and by declarations of rights in countries with a written constitution, and, consequently, whether it will be the Court of Justice's task to ensure the precedence of the Charter's provisions where there is a conflict in law;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 77
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to explain the legal scope of Article 2 (the 'right to life'), in view of the enormous variation between countries in terms of ethical, philosophical and social approach to this subject, and to indicate whether it is for the Member States, acting within their sovereignty and traditions, or for the Court of Justice, acting on a uniform basis for the entire EU, to rule on the issue of the moment at which life begins (conception or birth) or on that of the ethical conditions under which life may be ended by euthanasia;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 78
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to specify how the Court of Justice will evaluate the notion of 'constitutional traditions common to the Member States' referred to in Article 7, on subjects on which, precisely. Member States' laws diverge;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 79
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to indicate the concrete meaning of the Court of Justice's duty to interpret the Charter 'bearing in mind' its 'explanations', given that those 'explanations' are not binding in law, are brief, and were drawn up 'in the corridors' and approved by the Praesidium of the Convention without a proper debate,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 80
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; the same applies to the 'national margin of appreciation' left to the Member States, which is also limited by the rights proclaimed in the Charter, as the Court of Justice has ruled in a decision of its Grand Chamber of 27 June 2006 (C-540-03, Parliament v Council);
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 81
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council, nonetheless, to clarify the scope of Articles 1 (human dignity) and 3 (right to physical and mental integrity), by indicating whether these provisions establish a legal basis for an action in law aimed at the recognition of a general right to abortion or of a right to assisted suicide or euthanasia;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 82
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to specify whether the incorporation under the Charter of rights that have hitherto been national, such as the prohibition of capital punishment (Article 2) or the right to strike (article 28) amounts to a transfer of powers to the Union, or whether their presence is a purely declaratory matter without binding force in law;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 83
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to specify whether the incorporation under the Charter of rights that have hitherto been national, such as the prohibition of capital punishment (Article 2) or the right to strike (article 28) amounts to a transfer of powers to the Union, or whether their presence is a purely declaratory matter without legal effect;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 84
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; in view of the considerable scope of the powers conferred, exclusively or otherwise, on the Union institutions and of the primacy of EU law, the Charter included, calls on the Council to provide a clear and exact list of those national competences to which the Charter will not apply;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 85
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to specify the scope of Article 5, under which the Union is to fight all forms of discrimination, including that grounded in 'religion or convictions', although national law, which the Union must respect, may confer a special status on a particular faith - e.g. Anglicanism in the UK - or may more broadly manifest attitudes which the Union could find 'discriminatory' on grounds that cannot be anticipated today;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 86
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to indicate whether, under Article 10 of the Charter ('freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief'), the expression 'in public' also covers the concept 'in the context of public service';
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 87
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to indicate whether Article 1a of the Treaty and Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter relate to specific rights of 'minorities' and particular measures to be taken on their behalf, or, rather, simply constitute a call to respect the rights of the persons concerned on the same basis as those of all citizens, given that the interpretation chosen will determine whether or not significant national constitutional provisions will lapse;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 88
Paragraph 3, point a)
a) recognition of the binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights means that all provisions of EU law and all action taken by the EU institutions or based on EU law will have to comply with those standards; calls on the Council to act to remove the contradiction between Article 53 of the Charter and the Charter's intended role as a benchmark for the Court of Justice, whose interpretation will be final and not subject to appeal, even should it be contrary to 'human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised ... by ... the Member States' constitutions';
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 98
Paragraph 3, point d)
d) the introduction of a EU citizens' initiative will enable citizens to submit proposals on matters where they consider that a legal act of the Union is 'required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties'; calls on the Council to specify the nature of the Commission's obligations vis-à-vis a proposal submitted by at least a million citizens under the conditions referred to in Article 8b of the TEU and Article 21 of the TFUE;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 99
Paragraph 3, point d)
d) the introduction of a EU citizens' initiative will enable citizens to submit proposals on matters where they consider that a legal act of the Union is 'required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties'; calls on the Council to state whether a proposal for a legislative act originating in one of more national parliaments representing tens of millions of citizens could be considered admissible as a citizens' initiative, or whether the national parliaments should remain without any right of legislative initiative.
Amendment by
Amendment 105
Paragraph 4, point a)
a) a clear delimitation of the competencies of the Union vis-à-vis Member States is established, under the principle that all competencies that are not conferred upon the Union by the Treaties remain with the Member States; calls on the Council to clarify this rule, in view of the elastic nature of the Union's competencies, and, in particular, the teleological nature of the Court of Justice's interpretation of the Treaties and the absence of any right of veto that would allow Member States to reject texts that exceed the competencies explicitly conferred on the Union;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 106
Paragraph 4, point a)
a) a clear delimitation of the competencies of the Union vis-à-vis Member States is established, under the principle that all competencies that are not conferred upon the Union by the Treaties remain with the Member States; calls on the Council to provide a legal explanation of the choice of the term 'confer', rather than 'delegate', in respect of competencies, since the former implies an irreversible and uncontrollable transfer whereas the second is closer to the notion of a mandate and implies a transfer that can be revoked and controlled;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 107
Paragraph 4, point b)
b) there is a better focus on policies that visibly benefit citizens: there are new provisions of general application concerning the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, a high level of education, training and health, the elimination of all kinds of discrimination and the promotion of equality between women and men; new provisions enhance the promotion of sustainable development and protection of the environment, including fighting climate change, and the respect of services of general interest; economic, social and territorial cohesion is reaffirmed as an objective of the Union; calls on the Council, with a view to helping attain the majority of these objectives, which are dependent on our economies' growth and prosperity, to state if and how it intends to end the present costly exchange rate policy and overvaluation of the euro, which are preventing both wage rises and a return to a high rate of growth; calls on it to state more generally, in the light of the comparative growth and unemployment rates as between the eurozone and the non-euro zone, whether it believes that as things stand economic and monetary integration has been a success or a failure, and, consequently, whether it intends to allow the ECB to continue with its orthodox monetary management centred on containing inflation, whose one-size-fits-all approach fails to take account of different national circumstances and tends to make imbalances worse; also calls on the Council to indicate if and how the Union is authorised to operate a trade policy including retaliatory measures in the face of monetary dumping;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 111
Paragraph 4, point c)
c) the confusion between the 'European Community' and 'European Union' will end as the European Union becomes one single legal entity and structure; since the 'European Community' disappeared, becoming 'the Union', in the two treaties amended by the Treaty of Lisbon (TUE and TFUE), calls on the Council to state whether the same 'Union' is referred to in one and the other treaty, and, if so, to explain why it has kept two distinct treaties when their content has been modified in order to achieve, in reality, the merger proposed by the rejected constitutional treaty, which they reflect in both letter and spirit (Part I: Principles and Part III: Modalities);
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 115
Paragraph 4, point d)
d) a solidarity clause between Member States provides citizens with an expectation of receiving support from all parts of the Union in case of a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster; calls on the Council to specify whether the activation by the Union of this solidarity clause by mobilising 'all instruments at its disposal', including 'the military means placed at its disposal by the Member States', would be combined with the CFSP and the NATO requirements, thus giving birth to the integrated Euro-Atlantic defence system proposed in the 1953 treaty for the establishment of a European defence community;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 118
Paragraph 4, point e), introductory part
e) it confirms the specificity of the institutional organisation of the Union, to which Member States entrust certain of their competences that they consider to be better exerted through common mechanisms, while providing, for the avoidance of any doubts, sufficient guarantees that the Union will not become a centralised all-powerful 'superstate' - this despite the creation of a new entity with legal personality, the de facto merger of the treaties and the pillars of competencies, the unlimited jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, which will prevail over the national constitutional courts, the supranational character of future decision-making, the further massive transfers of fundamental competencies to the Union, including fundamental rights, and the absolute primacy, even over national constitutions, of a European law that affects virtually everything and is decided by qualified majority voting;

Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 123
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 1
– the obligation to respect the 'national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government', as well as 'their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'; calls on the Council to specify whether the 'national identity' which the Union claims to respect does or does not include respect by the EU for Member States' 'national sovereignty';
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 124
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 1
– the obligation to respect the 'national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government', as well as 'their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'; calls on the Council to specify whether the 'local and regional autonomy' invoked as part of the 'fundamental structures' of the Member States and which the Union is called on to respect reflects the Union's willingness to accept the jurisdiction of the national constitutional courts which are the guarantors of that autonomy, or whether the Union's partners are no longer the Member States alone and it will in future take on itself the right to establish direct and permanent relations with local and regional authorities;

Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 125
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 1
– the obligation to respect the 'national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government', as well as 'their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'; calls on the Council to specify whether the preservation of 'law and order' and 'national security' by the Member States could be the object of cooperation outside the Community procedures, given that the exercise of Member States' right of initiative in this area may in future only be collective and must involve at least one-quarter of the Union's members, following the removal of the provision for individual initiatives (TEU, Article 67(2));
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 126
Paragraph 4, point e), first indent
– the obligation to respect the 'national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government', as well as 'their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'; calls on the Council to state whether the new wording of the old Article 64(2) (EC Treaty) establishing a collectively decided protection mechanism means the disappearance of the safeguard clause for national use introduced by the Schengen agreement, under which a Member State can, unilaterally and provisionally, reintroduce internal border controls in the case of a serious threat; calls on the Council to indicate the reason or reasons for the removal of this Schengen safeguard clause;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 127
Paragraph 4, point e), first indent

– the obligation to respect the 'national identities of Member States, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government', as well as 'their essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security'; calls on the Council to specify whether the 'essential state functions' to be respected by the Union, notably 'law and order', cannot nonetheless be assumed by the Union in the name of a fundamental principle of Community law, as was ruled by the Court of Justice in, for example, its decision of 9 December 1997 (Commission v France, Case C-265/95) in the so-called 'strawberry wars' case, in which, in order to obtain the same effect, it nonetheless declared itself competent on the grounds that the issue at stake was the free movement of goods, even though the matter was clearly one of administrative policing and, therefore, of law and order;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 129
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 2
– the principles of conferred powers (whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality; calls on the Council to explain whether the term 'confer' should be understood in its literal sense, i.e. signifying a transfer of a permanent nature, or, rather, as synonymous with 'delegation', i.e. a notion implying the retention by Member States of a degree of control, on behalf of their citizens, over the delegated powers and the use made of them, and the possibility of returning them to the national sphere, precisely on grounds of subsidiarity, should experience show that the Union cannot, in the area concerned, act more effectively than the Member States;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 130
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 2
– the principles of conferred powers (whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality; calls on the Council to specify why the 'exclusive' competences which are 'conferred on' the Union have been removed from the scope of the principle of subsidiarity;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 131
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 2
– the principles of conferred powers (whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality; calls on the Council to specify the scope of the principle of proportionality and to indicate in what way its application is to be subject to democratic control, given that there is no participation of the national parliaments, despite the title of the Protocol ('on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality');
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 132
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 2
– the principles of conferred powers (whereby the Union's only competences are those conferred on it by the Member States), subsidiarity and proportionality; calls on the Council to specify whether the definition of the principle of subsidiarity includes implicitly (albeit not explicitly) the key democratic criterion, namely whether the possible greater effectiveness of the Union as compared to the Member States is in reality dependent on the quality of the democratic control exerted over the European competency, which should be at least as strong as the same power exerted at national level;
Or. fr
Amendment by
Amendment 134
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 3
– the participation of the Member States themselves in the Union's decision-making system and in agreeing any changes to it; calls on the Council to specify whether the formulation 'participation of the Member States … in the decision-making system' refers to the legislative role of the Council, which is subject to strict limits thanks to the shaping role of the Commission, which has the monopoly of initiative, determines at will the material framework for the exercise of legislative activity as well as the legal basis (hence the Community decision-making process), has all freedom to impose its 'proposals' since the Member States can amend them only by unanimity, uses divide-and-rule tactics when there is opposition, enjoys the power of execution over Council acts since it is free to decide itself (contrary to the principle of subsidiarity) what is 'necessary', and also enjoys the power of direct surveillance (notably in the case of competition law) and the power to punish, via direct financial penalties or by bringing actions before the Court of Justice;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 135
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 3
– the participation of the Member States themselves in the Union's decision-making system and in agreeing any changes to it; calls on the Council to specify whether the formulation 'participation of the Member States … in agreeing any changes' to the 'decision-making system' means that the Member States, which have as things stand almost no powers to monitor subsidiarity, could, where relevant, oppose what they saw as a violation by the Court of Justice of their remaining powers - e.g. an intensive use of Article 308 of the EC Treaty - or extensive interpretations by the Court of Justice having the effect of altering the decision-making process in a given field;
Or. fr


Amendment by
Amendment 137
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 4
– recognition of the right of Member States that wish to do so to leave the Union; calls on the Council to specify whether the right of withdrawal - typical of federal constitutions but not immediately applicable - would no longer apply if, during the two years of negotiations needed as a minimum following the request to withdraw, there was a change of government replacing that wishing to withdraw,
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 138
Paragraph 4, point e), indent 4
– recognition of the right of Member States that wish to do so to leave the Union; calls on the Council to state whether the right to withdraw from the Union also extends to leaving the euro, and, if so, to explain the nature of the parallel procedure for leaving the euro and to state whether or not the declarations made by the Member States when the single currency was created concerning the 'irrevocable' nature of the fixed exchange rates would still apply;
Or. fr



Amendment by
Amendment 141
Paragraph 5, point a)
a) the areas in which the governments meeting in the Council decide by qualified majority voting rather than by unanimity will increase substantially, thus enabling the Union of twenty-seven Member States to function in more areas without being blocked by vetoes; calls on the Council to publish without delay a study consisting of simulations enabling assessment of the concrete effects of the reform of QMV, so that all in the Member States, and notably the members of the national parliamentary bodies called on to ratify the treaty, can be properly informed concerning the majority thresholds by comparison with the existing weighted votes, the respective weight of each Member State in a Union of 27 and also in one of 30 (including Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey), and the facilities for adoption of Commission proposals;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 143
Paragraph 5, point b)
(b) a new system of "double majority" voting will facilitate reaching decisions in the Council; the Council is called upon to clarify - with reference to the second double-majority criterion - what is meant by 'the population of the Union' in the singular, which describes a population considered as a whole with no distinction between separate peoples; the current broad definition denoting all the inhabitants of a country (nationals and permanently resident foreigners) is vague, open to dispute and variable from one country to another;
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Amendment by
Amendment 145
Paragraph 5, point c)
(c) the six-months rotating presidency of the European Council will be replaced by a President elected by its members for a two-and-a-half-year term, thus allowing for more coherence in the preparation and follow up of its meetings; the Council is asked to describe the procedure for resolving possible conflicts between this President of the European Council and, on the one hand, the Commission President (with whom he will have to prepare the Council's work) and, on the other, the 'High Representative' for foreign policy and Commission Vice-President who, like him, will represent the Union externally as regards matters relating to the CFSP and will conduct that policy;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 146
Paragraph 5, point c)
(c) the six-months rotating presidency of the European Council will be replaced by a President elected by its members for a two-and-a-half-year term, thus allowing for more coherence in the preparation and follow up of its meetings; the Council is asked to indicate how it intends to safeguard the political interest, legitimacy and visibility of that future President, given that he will 'not be able to hold national office' and hence will not be a head of government or be directly accountable to a people, and how it intends to ensure that he is not merely an equivalent of the Commission President;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 147
Paragraph 5, point c)
(c) the six-months rotating presidency of the European Council will be replaced by a President elected by its members for a two-and-a-half-year term, thus allowing for more coherence in the preparation and follow up of its meetings; the Council is asked to specify whether the ban on any 'national' office may possibly be extended to any 'European' office (as stated in the initial draft, then deleted on the penultimate day of the Convention) and whether - if this is not to be the case - the Commission and European Council Presidents might not be one and the same person;


Amendment by
Amendment 150
Paragraph 5, point d)
(d) the number of members of the Commission will be reduced, as of 2014, to 2/3 of the number of Member States, thus conferring more cohesion to the college, while a rotation system ensures equal participation of all Member States; the Council is asked to indicate how the Member States are to be treated on an equal footing and how they are to maintain close and absolutely identical relations with the Commission when some of them will not form part of it;
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Amendment by
Amendment 154
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 1
– the Union's Foreign policy High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations - two posts causing duplication and confusion - will be merged, creating a Vice President of the Commission/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and be able to speak for the Union on those subjects where the latter has a common position, thus ensuring more coherence to the external action of the Union; the Council is asked to state to which institution that High Representative will be answerable, how he will ensure 'the consistency of the Union's external action' in the event of a disagreement with the Council of Ministers and/or with the European Council President and/or with the Commission (within which he will in quantitative terms perform most of his tasks relating to international negotiations on the environment, space, energy, trade policy, immigration and the movement of persons) and who - the High Representative or the European Council President - will represent the Union externally;

Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 155
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 1
– the Union's Foreign policy High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations - two posts causing duplication and confusion - will be merged, creating a Vice President of the Commission/High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who will chair the Foreign Affairs Council, and be able to speak for the Union on those subjects where the latter has a common position, thus ensuring more coherence to the external action of the Union; the Council is asked to indicate whether, in view of the envisaged single foreign policy and the granting of legal personality which will make the Union a fully-fledged international player, it intends to follow the recommendations contained in the European Parliament's report A5-0480/2003 on the relations between the European Union and the United Nations, in which a call is issued for the Union to be given a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which would of necessity lead to the disappearance of the permanent seats occupied by France and the United Kingdom;

Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 157
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 2
– a single external action service, composed of civil servants of the institutions and of the national diplomacies, under the responsibility of the Vice-President/High Representative, will ensure coherence of the execution of the Union's external action; the Council is asked to indicate whether the use of the title 'Ambassador' (which has been misappropriated to the detriment of national diplomats and which is widespread within the hundred or so Commission 'delegations' scattered across the world) is to be penalised or - on the contrary - legalised;

Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 158
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 2
– a single external action service, composed of civil servants of the institutions and of the national diplomacies, under the responsibility of the Vice-President/High Representative, will ensure coherence of the execution of the Union's external action; the Council is asked to indicate whether that diplomatic service, which could initially have approximately 7000 staff and which will be superimposed on the Member States' diplomatic services, will cast the latter into a mere supporting role;
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Amendment by
Amendment 163
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 3
– the Union's capacity to develop common structures in the field of security and defence policy will be reinforced, while ensuring the necessary flexibility to cater for differing approaches of Member States to such matters; the Council is asked to state whether, in view of the new provisions relating to the 'common security and defence policy', defence will continue to be a matter for the Member States; this is not spelt out in the text, yet it has significant implications as regards - for example - the question of nuclear defence, which is a crucial one at a time of proliferation;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 164
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 3
– the Union's capacity to develop common structures in the field of security and defence policy will be reinforced, while ensuring the necessary flexibility to cater for differing approaches of Member States to such matters; the Council is kindly requested to state how the security and defence policy (which is still subject to unanimous voting) could be an 'integral part of the common foreign and security policy', which is increasingly determined by means of qualified-majority voting;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 165
Paragraph 5, point e), indent 3
– the Union's capacity to develop common structures in the field of security and defence policy will be reinforced, while ensuring the necessary flexibility to cater for differing approaches of Member States to such matters; the Council is asked to state how the European Parliament will be able to perform its assigned task of parliamentary scrutiny over what is a fundamentally national and variable-geometry policy, since the text says nothing about the role of the national parliaments and the WEU Parliamentary Assembly is threatened with extinction;
Or. fr


Amendment by
Amendment 167
Paragraph 5, point f)
(f) the distinction between legislative and executive instruments will be clarified and a new definition of delegated acts will make it possible to simplify and streamline the legislation of the Union; the Council is asked to spell out the 'mechanisms for control by Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers', given that the Member States are not to have any 'right of recall' enabling them to monitor the implementing measures, that the Council will have to 'duly justify' the implementing powers which it wishes to keep, and that the 'comitology' rules in particular will in future be determined by means of a majority vote involving European Parliament codecision - the probable effect being to weaken the Member States' control over the implementing measures;
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Amendment by
Amendment 169
Paragraph 5, point (g)
(g) the pillars structure is abandoned, allowing for unity of action in the different fields of activity of the Union with simplified mechanisms and instruments, although the specific nature of external and security policies implies specific procedures in these domains;; the Council will indicate whether this merger of the pillars and unification of decision-making procedures, which will result in the automatic extension of the Court of Justice's jurisdiction to all matters covered by the Treaty, including the CFSP, nevertheless preserves a number of firm exceptions – particularly public order and internal security – which the Court, as the supreme arbiter of subsidiarity, will not bring under its jurisdiction;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 172
Paragraph 5, point (h)
(h) action in the area of justice and home affairs will have more ambitious goals and more effective procedures, no longer using separate intergovernmental instruments and procedures, and will be submitted to judicial review, thus promising tangible progress with regard to justice, security and immigration issues; the Council is asked to indicate whether Communitisation of the 'Area of freedom, security and justice', which groups together policies that are intimately connected to the foundations underpinning society in each European nation and therefore requires a high degree of control by each national democracy, will prohibit any variable-geometry and -geography cooperation outside the Treaty framework, as has been successfully developed in recent years, including the interconnection of judicial records between four countries since 2004, the Prüm Treaty, known as 'Schengen plus', of 27 May 2005 between seven countries on the exchange of genetic data, fingerprints, registration details, the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration and G6 Ministers of the Interior meetings since 2003 to facilitate decisions between countries with similar approaches to these issues;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 174
Paragraph 5, point (i)
(i) the Union's objectives and competencies in the fields of climate change, energy, space, tourism, sport, public health and civil protection are defined in a clearer way; the Council will specify, in this connection, whether the 'shared competences', which are those in which the States may intervene provided the Union agrees, cover domains other than those set out in Article 2C, and more generally anything 'which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 2 B and 2 E', including economic and employment policies and the common foreign and security policy, which also appear as 'shared competences', with specific procedures;
Or. fr



Amendment by
Amendment 177
Paragraph 5, point (j)
(j) for a number of other matters, it will become possible to apply more efficient methods of decision-making as soon as there is the political will to do so; the Council will indicate whether, in addition to the many instruments which exist in the Treaty to extend the European Union's competences without having to go through the normal revision procedures and formal ratification by the national parliaments (in particular the flexibility clause in Article 308 and the many 'passerelle' clauses), there are instruments which may be used to restore competences for the States where this seems necessary, as called for in the Laeken Declaration of December 2001 on the future of the Union;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 178
Paragraph 5, point (k)
(k) there is more room for flexible arrangements when not all Member States are willing or able to go ahead with certain policies at the same time; the Council is asked to specify whether Article 10 on 'enhanced cooperation' by groups of Member States in areas of competence not yet or not entirely Communitised also applies to defence, and whether, although such cooperation does not cover 'exclusive competences' and is seemingly aimed solely at strengthening the integration process, it could nevertheless allow differentiated ( i.e. variable-geometry and -geography) cooperation to be introduced;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 190
Paragraph 6, indent 1
– abandon the constitutional approach and certain of its features, such as a new, single and structured text, the clearer terminology to designate legislative instruments, the symbols and the designation of the High Representative as 'Foreign Minister'; it should be recalled, however, that the European Treaties include rules which are in practice of a constitutional nature and that the Court of Justice has even described these Treaties as a 'basic constitutional charter' (CJEC, 23 April 1986, 'Parti écologiste Les Verts', Case 294/83, ECR 1339) and even as 'the constitutional Charter of a Community based on the rule of law' (CJEC, 14 December 1991, Opinion 1/91, ECR I-6079), and that, apart from one or two purely cosmetic changes to the text, there is in practice nothing to distinguish the constitutional content of the rejected 2004 Treaty of Rome from that of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 194
Paragraph 6, indent 1
– abandon the constitutional approach and certain of its features, such as a new, single and structured text, the clearer terminology to designate legislative instruments, the symbols and the designation of the High Representative as 'Foreign Minister'; it should be recalled, however, that, despite the absence of any relevant legal basis in the Treaties, there is increasingly widespread use of the Union's symbols (especially the flag and anthem) in the day-to-day business of the EU institutions and Member States, that the term 'legislative act' is in fact constitutional in nature and that Commissioners are sometimes referred to as 'Ministers' during their visits outside the Union;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 199
Paragraph 6, indent 3
– incorporate into the Treaty measures specific to individual Member States, such as the extension of the 'opt-in' arrangements for the UK and Ireland to police co-operation and criminal law, the protocol limiting the effect of the Charter on the domestic law of the UK and Poland and the extra parliamentary seat attributed to Italy in derogation of the principle of degressive proportionality; the impact of such 'arrangements' should not, however, be overestimated, given the numerous ramifications of European law, and the fact that it accounts for around 80% of laws applicable in the Union and that it takes absolute precedence over all national laws, including constitutional provisions; moreover, a report by the UK House of Commons European Affairs Committee, of 9 October 2007, predicts, in the light of case law trends, that the Court of Justice will inevitably circumvent some of the 'opt-in' arrangements;
Or. fr



Amendment by
Amendment 204
Paragraph 6, indent 4
– modify the wording of several passages of the Treaty, or of the declarations annexed to it, entailing an unjustified shift to a negative tone, which gives an impression of mistrust vis-à-vis the Union and its institutions and thus sends a wrong signal to the public; the citizens of Europe's nations are in particular concerned about the agreement reached by the governments on the sidelines of the Lisbon negotiations to the effect that none of them would hold a referendum, so as to avoid running the risk of the made-over constitutional draft also being rejected;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 219
Paragraph 8
8. Rejects the Treaty and hopes that all Member States of the Union will do the same, given that it circumvents the democratically expressed rejection of the constitution in France and the Netherlands and that it should anyway have been put to referendum in all the Member States;
Or. fr

Amendment by
Amendment 220
Paragraph 8
8. Endorses the Treaty and hopes that all Member States of the Union will be in a position to achieve its ratification by 1 January 2009, by involving their peoples, through referendums, in this fundamental stage in the European integration process;
Or. fr




Amendment by
Amendment 227
Paragraph 9
9. Is aware that an amending treaty is inevitably less clear and readable than a codified treaty, but looks forward to the rapid publication of the consolidated Treaties as revised by the Treaty of Lisbon and, more generally, the some 3 000 pages of primary law in force under the 18 treaties and acts with the same legal value, which will provide citizens with a clearer basic text of the Union;
Or. fr



Amendment by
Amendment 231
Paragraph 10
10. Reiterates its request that all possible efforts be deployed, both by EU institutions and national authorities in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, in order to inform European citizens clearly and objectively about the content of the Treaty; points out that clear and objective information means, in particular, enabling supporters and opponents of the Treaty to engage in public debates on an equal footing, which requires them to have the same share of communication budgets and a guarantee of balanced media coverage, which was not the case during the referendum campaign in 2005;

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